When it comes to lobbying, which works better: the 'Big Man' model or Grassroots Lobbying?

In case you hadn't noticed so far, the point of this blog is to convince you that if you really want to be effective as a student leader and activist, then - no matter what the issue is that you want to resolve - your best strategy is to go to Beacon Hill, establish some credibility and communication by lobbying for the University's budget, and then parlay whatever influence you can gain by your presence at the state house into pressure on the campus administration.

You can (and probably will) try other strategies. Listen to the voice of the past: none of them will work as effectively as this one.

But as we move forward in this discussion about fighting for UMass, it is time to address the central problems that the University faces, and reflect on this history of how the campus administration and the students have attempted to address these problems in the past.

For some of you, this may be old news or obvious to you. But for many student leaders and activists, it is undoubtedly new and vital information that you need as you evolve into the most thoughful, articulate, passionate, and effective activists you can be.

Toward this end, it is critically important that you read, and reread, and read again and again - the attached PDF file titled "The Whitehead Group Report". This is an 80 page draft of a memo that was written as a briefing document for incoming Chancellor Joe Duffy in 1982. The original draft has no official name, but is/was often referred to as the "Whitehead Group Report" for reasons that become obvious once you read the document. At any rate, this draft memo is critically important because it gives a detailed political history of the University (it's creation by the state legislature, relations with the state legislature, attempts by students and administrators to fight for increased funding, etc.,)

Problem:
When it comes to the issue of Public Higher Education, Massachusetts is different than pretty much every other state in the country because: 1) we are home to some of the most prestigous private colleges and universities in the world, and; 2) we are also the only state in the country that has a 'private higher education' industry with hundreds of other colleges and universities that compete for the affections and support of the general public.

Think about it this way. If you live west of the Mississippi and you want to go to a University, chances are you are going to go to a state school. Can you name two large private, prestigious Universities west of the Mississippi? Probably not. That's because in most other states, higher education is dominated by the PUBLIC colleges and universities. In fact, in most other states, the public colleges and universities enjoy widespread support and even adoration from both the public and the state legislature.

Here in Massachusetts, not only are our public colleges and universities often considered the 'ugly step-child' so to speak, we are also the 'johnny come lately'. The state's tradition of higher education predates the founding of the United States, and yet for all intents and purposes our public colleges and universities are barely half a century old.

The problem for the Amherst campus is exacerbated by the fact that is located outside of the Boston media market and away from the state's power base.

Answer?

So what can 'we' do to address this problem, this lack of adequate support for our public University and the flagship campus of our system? In this section we will address the three basic models that have been used by both administrators and students to deal with this problem

Model #1: The Administration's Plan 'A'; The 'Big Man' Model. This model comes first for a very simple reason. It is the original model - the one that was used to create the University in the first place. Think of it this way: with all of the challenges facing the public higher education in the country, how did UMass even come to be in the first place?

The answer is simple: during the 1950's a small group of powerful men in the state legislature used their power and influence to transform UMass from a small state agricultural college to a large, modern public research University with more than 20,000 students in a little more than a decade. As the 'Whitehead Group Report' says the creation of the University was not the "product of a broadbased political discourse", which if you know and understand the political nature of Beacon Hill you know that almost nothing important that happens up there is the product of a 'broadbased political discourse'. Almost all the power is concentrated in the hands of the Speaker, Senate President and the chairmen of the House and Senate Ways and Means Committee. What the leadership wants, the leadership gets.

The 1940's and 50's saw the political ascendence of Irish Catholic urban Democrats both here in Massachusetts and nationally. These men had grown up in a period when college was the exclusive priveledge of the state's Protestant middle-class and upper-class establishment. These Irish Catholic working class Democrats wanted to make sure that the sons and daughters of other working class and middle class immigrants had access to a college education and a path toward a middle class standard of living.

So here in Massachusetts they used their power and influence to build UMass out of a cow pasture. There were no petitions, no debate, and no public hearings. As the memo noted "there was no widespread public discourse." They did without asking anyone if they thought it was a good idea or if they even wanted it.

So for more than twenty years (until the mid to late 70's roughly), when it came to getting support for the University from the State Legislature there was no grassroots lobbying. There was no need for rallies, phone calls, or post cards. All of the 'lobbying' the University had to do took place in a single phone call: from the University Chancellor to the Speaker of the House. Badda boom, badda bing! That was it.

And they did it without raising alarm of the private higher ed industry by 'disguising' the true nature of some of the buildings they were funding. In other words: they lied do conceal the fact that they were trying to build a public research University so that the other private research Universities wouldn't rally mobilize their considerable political influence against them.

In many ways, this effort was heroic. These people, who had suffered the scars of intense discrimination and inequality used their new found power to right the wrongs of the past.

But on the other hand, this model left the University completely vulnerable. Because the problem with this model, the "Big Man" model - is that it relies exclusively on the power and influence of a handful of very commmitted, very powerful men to take an interest in the University and its mission.

From the administration and the Board of Trustees perspective, this traditionally has been THE model because when this model works, it works better than any other model hands down. In the University gets more money and support with very little effort or energy, and equally important is the fact that they don't have to rely on any pain in the arse alumni, faculty or students - who might want to have some say over how the new monies are spent if they have a hand in helping bring those monies to campus (which we will cover in more depth later).

There are a number of problems with this model of course - and a few of them should be obvious. Not the least of which is the fact that once the 'big man' goes away (ie. retires, takes another job, runs for another office, resigns in disgrace, or maybe even goes to jail) the University is left completely empty handed and vulnerable. There is no SECOND BIGGEST MAN to step in and carry our water. And given the fact that public higher education is the biggest piece of the state budget that CAN be cut in times of trouble (unlike Medicare and Medicaid), the absence of a BIG Man to protect us leaves us with a big bulls-eye on our back.

But another problem with this model is that it does absolutely nothing to get the public to support and care about its public colleges and Universities they way that people love and care about their state schools in many, many other states. Many of us who have done this work in the past concede that the Big Man model works in the short term, but in the long term it only solidifies the entire public higher ed system's status as second-class to the private schools because it doesn't engage the public in the 'broad based discourse' that eventually needs to happen if we want to stop the endless cycles of bust and boom and build UMass into the world-class University that it can and should be.

Model #2: The Administration's Plan 'B'; Punt. And then Pass on Cuts and Cost Increases to Students, Families, Faculty and Staff. This model is simple. In the absence of a 'Big Man' on Beacon Hill or in the President's Office to fight for the campus when there is a problem, you simply punt. You slash the budget, raise tuition and fees, get your resume together and get the hell out of dodge. Abandon your obligations to the mission of UMass and the citizens of the Commonwealth and go find a cushy gig at a college or University that is not plagued by the unique circumstances of public higher education in Massachusetts.

Model #3: Mobilize a Grassroots Legislative Base to Lobby for the University's Budget Request. In this model, the various constituencies of the University (the students, the faculty, the alumni, the parents) mobilize their massive grassroots numbers and pressure elected officials to support the University's budget request. It has been used successfully a number of times by both the administration and the students - and it is obviously the model that is embraced here on this blog. It isn't simple, and it isn't perfect, it cannot always be implemented with maximum efficacy and efficiency, and it cannot always be executed exactly the same way each time it is used. But if you care about building public support for the University, keeping costs low, and keeping the University accessible to the people it is supposed to serve - then this model is at the very least a step in the right direction.

And although in most cases, the administration has eschewed this model, ironically - it was the administration in 1980 that was the first to use this model successfully. The 'Whitehead Group Report' is the case study of the Univerity administration's successful campaign to defend UMass' budget in the face of devastating budget cuts.

Of course, the rest of this blog is essentially a case study in how the SGA and SCERA used this model successfully during the 1990's - not just to increase the University's budget allocation but also to force the administration to concede on a number of key local issues.

So Why is the Admnistration Usually Very Hostile to Grassroots Model?

The answer is simple. When the administration has to rely upon groups like the SGA, or the Alumni Association to help increase the state allocation to UMass - then those groups inevitably want to have some say over how those new monies will be spent.

Basically, from the administration's perspective, they have two choices:

Choice A: A larger pie, but some small degree of shared decision making with those pain in the ass students and alumni who went all the way to Beacon Hill and actually lobbied for the money. Work with students, alumni, etc., to pressure the legislature to give more funding, and then give the students and alumni some say over how to spend a small amount of the new money.

Choice B: A smaller pie, but 100% control of the money and how will be spent. If this means budget cuts, and tuition and fee increases - no problem. The students and staff can simply 'eat cake' as Marie Antoinette, or the typical passionless administrator might say just before they collect their last taxpayer funded pay check and abandon the mission of the University and the taxpayers for a better gig somewhere else.

I think history has shown pretty clearly that the vast majority of administrators and members of the Board of Trustees prefer Option 'B'. As a general rule, the administration will choose a smaller pie but total control every time - unless the students force them to do otherwise.

In fact, I belive that one of the most powerful examples of this principle is the case study about GEO and the issue of Agency Fee. At one point, the administration was so opposed to Agency Fee they allowed a 3 week strike by grad employees. Three years later, GEO forced to the administration to spend 10% of a new $12 million increase and just like that! - the administration turned 180 degrees on the issue of Agency Fee. When it came down to it, the administration cared more about control of the money than anything else.

Conclusion:

The University needs a permanent legislative base if we are ever going to build the kind of support necessary to make UMass a world class University.